St Maarten Prisoner Sent To Netherlands Prison SUES Sxm Government FULL Court Transcripts in English
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In the summary proceedings of 15 April 2025, heard by the provisional relief judge of the District Court of The Hague, the claimant, a citizen of Sint Maarten who has been in detention since 30 October 2018,
filed a claim against the Country of Sint Maarten and the State of the Netherlands. The claimant requested his transfer back to Sint Maarten within seven days, because he believed that his stay in the Netherlands was unlawful.
The applicant had originally been sentenced to a prison term of sixteen years for various offences and had been transferred to the Netherlands on 13 May 2023 by a ministerial order authorising a temporary transfer for up to six months for security reasons following the damage caused by Hurricane Irma to the prison on Sint Maarten.
The applicant claimed that his stay in the Netherlands beyond this term was unlawful as no extension had been requested and he had therefore been cut off from his family, which would be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The interim relief judge ruled that the claimant was admissible in his claim, despite the defendants’ defense that he should turn to the criminal court in Sint Maarten. The judge found that the claimant was detained in the Netherlands and that it was practically impossible for him to start proceedings in Sint Maarten.
In the substantive assessment, the court determined that the claimant was not residing in the Netherlands without a lawful title, since his prison sentence could also be served in the Netherlands on the basis of the Statute for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The court ruled that the extension of his residence in the Netherlands, although not requested in time, did not lead to the unlawfulness of his detention.
As regards the principle of trust, the court held that the applicant was aware of the possibility of extending his stay and that the reasons for his detention in the Netherlands, such as the security situation in Sint Maarten, were still valid. The court also rejected the applicant’s reliance on Article 8 ECHR, because the restrictions on his family life were inherent to his detention and the interests of the execution of the prison sentence outweighed it.
Ultimately, the interim relief judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and ordered him to pay the defendants’ legal costs, which totalled €1,999.00. The judgment was pronounced by Mr. SJ Hoekstra-van Vliet.
Original pronunciation
Content indication
Summary proceedings. The claimant was transferred from Sint Maarten to the Netherlands on the basis of ORD 2, where his prison sentence imposed in Sint Maarten will be further served. The claimant’s request to transfer him back to Sint Maarten to have him continue to serve his detention there was dismissed. Admissibility, title for detention, principle of trust, 8 ECHR.
Pronunciation
The Hague District Court
Team trade – provisional relief judge
case / roll number: C/09/680637 / KG ZA 25-161
Summary judgment of April 15, 2025
in the matter of
[claimant]residing in the penitentiary institution in [place 1], plaintiff, attorney Mr. R. van Veen in Utrecht,
in return for:
- the Country of Sint Maarten, more specifically the Ministry of Justice in Sint Maarten, 2. **the State of the Netherlands, more specifically the Ministry of Justice and Security **in The Hague, defendants, attorney mr. M. Beekes in The Hague.
The parties will hereinafter be referred to as ‘ [claimant] ‘, ‘the Country’ and ‘the State’ respectively.
1 The procedure
1.1. The course of the proceedings is apparent from: -the summons with productions; -the statement of defense with productions; -the oral hearing held on April 1, 2025, at which both parties submitted statements of defense.
1.2. During the hearing, judgment was set for today.
2 The facts
Based on the documents and the proceedings at the hearing of 1 April 2025, the following assumptions are made in these proceedings.
The applicable regulations
2.1. Article 40 of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter: the Charter) provides that judgments rendered by the courts in the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten may be enforced throughout the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of the country where the enforcement takes place.
2.2. On the basis of the Mutual Arrangement as referred to in Article 38 of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, regulating cooperation between the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten in the area of the mutual provision of detention capacity on medical grounds or in connection with urgent reasons of safety of 1 July 2014, Stcrt. 2014, no. 17851 (hereinafter: ORD 2), the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten will make detention capacity available to each other if – insofar as relevant here – urgent reasons of safety make further stay in detention on Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba irresponsible.
The other facts
2.3. [claimant] is a citizen of Sint Maarten. He has been in detention since October 30, 2018. Until May 13, 2023, he was detained in prison [place 2] on Sint Maarten.
2.4. By judgment of the Court of First Instance of Sint Maarten of 6 March 2019, [plaintiff] was sentenced to a prison term of sixteen years for manslaughter, attempted manslaughter (committed several times), assault and possession of a weapon.
2.5. By Ministerial Order of 2 May 2023 of the Minister for Legal Protection (hereinafter: the Minister), a request from the Attorney General of Curaçao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (hereinafter: the Attorney General) for the temporary transfer of [claimant] to the Netherlands on the basis of ORD 2 was granted, for a maximum period of six months with effect from the date of the temporary transfer. The Order states that a request for extension, on the grounds of the continued need to stay in the Netherlands, must be submitted at least 1.5 months before the end of the six-month period. The Order states that the transfer of [claimant] is related to the damage caused to [location 2] by Hurricane Irma. As a result, not all detainees can yet be accommodated safely and, in particular, there is no adequate provision for detainees with a long-term sentence and an increased individual security level.
2.6. On 13 May 2023, [claimant] was transferred to the PI [location 3] in the Netherlands. Since then, [claimant] has been in detention in the Netherlands.
2.7. On 16 October 2023, 29 April 2024 and 18 February 2025, the Attorney General repeatedly requested an extension of the temporary transfer of [claimant] to the Netherlands. These requests were made respectively on: 22 January 2024 (for the period from 13 November 2023 to 13 May 2024), 22 May 31, 2024 (for the period from 13 May 2024 to 13 November 2024) and 22 February 18, 2025 (for the period from 13 November 2024 to 13 May 2025)
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assigned by the Minister. In the decision of 22 January 2024 it was considered that due to the damage caused by Hurricane Irma to [location 2], not all detainees can be accommodated safely and that in particular there is no adequate provision for detainees with long-term sentences and an increased individual security level. The decisions in the decision of 31 May 2024 and 18 February 2025 were taken “taking into account the limited prison capacity in the European Netherlands and in view of the importance of security in [location 2] in Sint Maarten”. A new extension request has now been submitted for the period after 13 May 2025. No decision has yet been made on that request.
2.8. By email dated July 18, 2024, [plaintiff]’s attorney informed the Chief Public Prosecutor of Sint Maarten (hereinafter: the Chief Public Prosecutor) as follows:
“Client was transferred from Sint Maarten, [location 2], to the Netherlands on May 16, 2023. The messages he received stated that this transfer was temporary, for a period of 6 months. After these 6 months, client has not heard anything from the Public Prosecution Service. On May 14, I sent the Public Prosecution Service an email in which I brought the client’s matter to their attention. The correspondence below then took place, to which I refer you.
By letter dated 24 June 2024, the client was informed that his transfer to the Netherlands had been extended (see attachment). This is the first letter that the client has received in this context.
I hereby object to this course of events. Now that the Public Prosecution Service has stated that the transfer was for a period of 6 months, the client was entitled to rely on that. After the expiry of this period, in November 2023, the client was wrongly detained in the Netherlands. The letter of 24 June does not change that.
Client has a very important interest in being returned to Sint Maarten. Client cannot have any contact with his son. Due to the time difference and the telephone restrictions, client can only have sporadic contact with his son during the weekend. This is not in the interest of this minor and in conflict with the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. Prisoners also have this right.
It is understandable in the context of an emergency measure that the client has been temporarily transferred. However, this transfer has not been extended after six months. Moreover, this transfer is now taking too long. The rights of the client are being violated irregularly.
I request you to reconsider the client’s case. I kindly request you to inform me within 4 weeks from today that the client will be transferred back to Sint Maarten. If this is not possible immediately, I request you to prioritize the client’s transfer and to inform me when the client will be returning. The client has – within the framework of art. 8 ECHR – the right to have a view of transfer back to Sint Maarten.”
2.9. The aforementioned email message led to telephone contact between the chief public prosecutor and [claimant]’s lawyer, followed by an email dated September 12, 2024 from the chief public prosecutor to [claimant]’s lawyer with the following content:
“As discussed, a so-called exchange is being considered, which means that another prisoner from Sint Maarten will go to the Netherlands and that Mr. [claimant] will then return to Sint Maarten. This may take some time because the Netherlands needs information about the other convict and because, if this were to go ahead, transport would have to be arranged.”
In a subsequent email from the Chief Prosecutor dated September 16, 2024, the following is stated:
“At the moment a so-called ORD 2 request is being drawn up for the other convicted person, as soon as the Netherlands approves this we can arrange the transport. I cannot say exactly how long this approval will take. Our aim is certainly to have this completed in 2024.”
Thereafter, further e-mail contact took place between [claimant]’s lawyer and the chief prosecutor about the state of affairs, in which the chief prosecutor repeatedly indicated that he was awaiting approval from the Dutch authorities. To date, [claimant] has not been transferred from the Netherlands to Sint Maarten.
3 The dispute
3.1. [plaintiff] claims – in essence – that the Country and the State be ordered to transfer him to Sint Maarten within seven days of this judgment, with the Country and the State being ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
3.2. To this end, [claimant] argues – in summary – the following. The Country and the State are acting unlawfully by allowing [claimant] to stay in the Netherlands. [Claimant]’s stay in the Netherlands was not extended within the applicable period of six months according to the statutory scheme after his transfer, as a result of which [claimant] now resides in the Netherlands without any right or title. Furthermore, [claimant] has been cut off from his son and other family members by the transfer to the Netherlands. His family does not have the financial means to visit [claimant] in the Netherlands and the possibilities for maintaining telephone contact are very limited. [Claimant]’s stay in the Netherlands is therefore in conflict with the right to family life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR. Furthermore, [claimant]’s continued residence in the Netherlands is in conflict with the principle of trust. [Claimant] would be transferred to the Netherlands for a maximum of six months and was entitled to rely on that. Furthermore, in September 2024 (and thereafter) the public prosecutor promised him that he would be transferred to Sint Maarten. That promise was also not kept.
3.3. The Country and the State raise a defense, which will be discussed below, to the extent necessary.
4 The assessment of the dispute
Receptivity
4.1. The most far-reaching defence of the Country and the State is that [plaintiff] is inadmissible in his claim. The Country and the State refer to article 43 paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Sint Maarten. On the basis of this article, in all cases in which the interest of a proper administration of criminal justice makes a provision urgently necessary and the Code itself does not contain any provision in this regard, a request for such a provision can be submitted to the criminal court by the suspect or the person who has a direct interest in this that specifically concerns him. The Country and the State state that this article also extends to the execution phase of an imposed prison sentence. According to the Country and the State, [plaintiff] must apply to the criminal court on Sint Maarten on the basis of this article and that this prevents the provisional relief judge from being admissible in these summary proceedings.
4.2. The starting point is that [plaintiff] can only be admitted in these summary proceedings if no other competent court or special legal procedure has been designated. If that is the case and that designated court or legal procedure offers sufficient legal protection, [plaintiff] must be declared inadmissible. In urgent cases, such as the one at issue here, the interim relief judge must also examine whether [plaintiff] can achieve a result comparable to the civil summary proceedings with that other legal procedure.
4.3. The provisional relief judge agrees with [claimant], and therefore contrary to what the Country and the State have argued, that the aforementioned summary criminal proceedings in this specific case are not legal proceedings in which [claimant] can achieve a result comparable to these summary proceedings. The provisional relief judge therefore considers him admissible in these summary proceedings. In this respect, it is first of all relevant that [claimant] is detained in the Netherlands and that he has extremely limited financial resources. The provisional relief judge therefore considers it sufficiently plausible that it is both financially and practically extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, for him to engage a lawyer from the penitentiary institution in the Netherlands who will initiate proceedings on his behalf in Sint Maarten on the basis of Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Sint Maarten. [claimant] has stated uncontested that a local lawyer asks for a substantial advance payment that he cannot pay. Furthermore, proceedings in Sint Maarten would mean that [claimant] would not be able to attend the hearing of that case himself, while it is also unclear whether a decision can actually be obtained in the short term in such a case. In addition, [claimant] is not only litigating against the Country, but is also instituting a claim against the State on the basis of an unlawful act. After all, he claims that the State is unlawfully cooperating in his stay in the Netherlands. [Claimant] can be admitted to the civil provisional relief judge in the claim against the State without further ado. Given the connection between the claim against the State and that against the Country and also given the detention conditions of [claimant], it cannot reasonably be expected of him that he initiate separate criminal summary proceedings against the Country in Sint Maarten in this case. The provisional relief judge will therefore admit [claimant] in his claim, both insofar as it is directed against the State and insofar as it is directed against the Country.
Substantive assessment
Title for detention in the Netherlands
4.4. The interim relief judge states that [claimant], contrary to what he claims, is not in detention in the Netherlands without a lawful title. [claimant] was sentenced to a prison sentence by the court of first instance in Sint Maarten. On the basis of article 40 of the Statute, that prison sentence may also be executed in the Netherlands. This means that there is a title for the execution of the prison sentence in the Netherlands and that execution is not unlawful.
4.5. This is not altered by the fact that his residence in the Netherlands was not extended within the period stated in ORD 2 and that [claimant] was not always directly informed of the extension decisions taken on the basis of ORD 2. The Country and the State rightly state that ORD 2 is a mutual arrangement between the State and the Country. [claimant] cannot directly derive any rights from it. Insofar as the extension of [claimant]’s residence in the Netherlands was not requested in time and [claimant] was not always directly informed of that extension, this does not mean that his residence in the Netherlands has lost its title or that the residence in the Netherlands has already become unlawful for that reason.
Violation of the principle of trust
4.6. Contrary to what [claimant] claims, there is also no violation of the principle of trust because he must stay in the Netherlands for more than six months. The starting point in ORD 2 is a temporary stay in the Netherlands, for a period of six months. However, ORD 2 also states that this stay can be extended if (insofar as relevant now) the urgent reasons of safety still require this. The possibility of extension is also mentioned in the decision of 2 May 2023, on the basis of which [claimant] was transferred to the Netherlands. [claimant] has not stated that he was not aware of that decision. He was therefore aware of the possibility of extending the stay in the Netherlands from the outset.
4.7. The Country and the State have also sufficiently demonstrated that the urgent reasons of safety that underlie [claimant]’s stay in the Netherlands still exist. The statement of the chief public prosecutor submitted by the Country and the State shows, among other things, that there is a major shortage of cells and capacity in [place 2], as a result of which suspects of serious violent crimes are forced to return home every week, that there is gang formation in the prison and that there is a permanent shortage of staff. The chief public prosecutor writes that safety in [place 2] is still very fragile and that for that reason it is necessary and essential that other countries within the Kingdom of Sint Maarten assist in the detention of convicts of serious, violent crimes. [claimant] has not sufficiently substantiated this statement of the chief public prosecutor. [claimant] was therefore not allowed to assume that those reasons of safety no longer exist, nor could he conclude that he would therefore be able to return to Sint Maarten quickly. In that sense too, there is no question of justified confidence on the part of [claimant]. All this is not changed by [claimant]’s position that the detention capacity in the Netherlands is also under pressure. It is true that the Netherlands is also struggling with a cell shortage, but that does not detract from the serious situation in the prison on Sint Maarten, nor from the obligations of the Netherlands to take over detainees arising from ORD 2.
4.8. The statements of the chief officer as set out in 2.9 could not have given [claimant] the justified confidence that he would simply be transferred to Sint Maarten. After all, the prisoner exchange proposed by the chief officer was always made dependent in the correspondence with [claimant] onapproval by the Dutch authorities. That consent was not given because – as the State further explained at the hearing – the Netherlands will only agree to the transfer of a detainee from Sint Maarten to the Netherlands if the requirements in ORD 2 have been met. This means that, as far as the Netherlands is concerned, a possible prisoner exchange can only take place if the transfer of a detainee from Sint Maarten to the Netherlands is necessary for urgent medical or security reasons and Sint Maarten has indicated that it agrees to the simultaneous return of [claimant]. The State therefore does not want to agree to the transfer to the Netherlands of a detainee from Sint Maarten in the context of a prisoner exchange without the aforementioned ORD 2 conditions being met. The State is also free to do so. Under the aforementioned circumstances, it is not clear on what basis [claimant] could have had the justified expectation that he would simply return to Sint Maarten in the short term. All this does not, however, affect the fact that the State promised at the hearing that it will cooperate in [claimant]’s return to Sint Maarten if the Country takes the position that [claimant] can return safely to Sint Maarten, with or without a prisoner exchange as intended by the State.
Article 8 ECHR
4.9. Finally, [claimant]’s reliance on Article 8 ECHR cannot help him either. The mere fact that he is living far away from his family does not mean that he is being treated unlawfully by his continued residence in the Netherlands. As the State rightly states, restrictions on family life are inherent to detention. These are restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society and the importance of enforcing a prison sentence imposed by the court in this case outweighs the unlimited exercise of the right to family life. [claimant] can also maintain contact with his family despite his detention. Although receiving visits is difficult, that as such does not constitute a violation of Article 8 ECHR. [claimant] can in any case maintain contact by (video) calling. The State has sufficiently explained that, even taking into account the time difference with Sint Maarten and the son’s school hours, there are regular moments when [claimant] can call his son and other family members. In addition, these moments would occur more often if [claimant] were in the plus program. According to the State’s uncontested position, it is due to [claimant]’s own behavior that he is no longer in the plus program. He has been demoted several times, including due to positive urine tests, transgressive behavior and aggression. The last demotion is on October 24, 2024, on the grounds that [claimant] did not want to participate in work. As the State rightly states, [claimant] therefore has it in his own hands to earn more income, which will enable him to pay for longer telephone conversations with his son.
Conclusion and legal costs
4.10. The above results in the claim of [plaintiff] being dismissed. [plaintiff] must pay the legal costs (including additional costs) as the unsuccessful party. The legal costs of the Country and the State are estimated at:
court fee €714.00
lawyer salary €1,107.00
additional costs €178.00 (plus the increase as stated in the decision) Total €1,999.00
4.11. The statutory interest on the legal costs claimed is awarded as stated in the decision.
5 The decision
The interim relief judge:
5.1. dismisses [plaintiff]’s claim;
5.2. orders [plaintiff] to pay the costs of the proceedings of the Country and the State of € 1,999.00, to be paid within fourteen days after notice to that effect. If [plaintiff] does not comply with the costs order in time and the judgment is served thereafter, he must pay an additional € 92.00, plus the costs of service;
5.3. orders [plaintiff] to pay the statutory interest as referred to in Article 6:119 of the Dutch Civil Code on the legal costs if these have not been paid within fourteen days after notice;
5.4. declares this award of costs provisionally enforceable.
This judgment was rendered by Mr. SJ Hoekstra-van Vliet and pronounced in public on April 15, 2025.
Judges
Mrs. Mr. SJ Hoekstra-van Vliet
Further investigation